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ABSTRACT
In this work we propose a generic framework for generat-
ing an irreversible representation of multiple biometric tem-
plates based on adaptive Bloom filters. The presented tech-
nique enables a feature level fusion of different biometrics
(face and iris) to a single protected template, improving pri-
vacy protection compared to the corresponding systems based
on a single biometric trait. At the same time, a significant gain
in biometric performance is achieved, confirming the sound-
ness of the proposed technique.
Index Terms— Template protection, biometric fusion,
Bloom filter, face, iris
1. INTRODUCTION
Biometric template protection schemes [1], commonly cate-
gorized as biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biomet-
rics, offer solutions to privacy preserving biometric authenti-
cation. Cancelable biometrics consist of intentional, repeat-
able distortions of biometric signals that provide a compar-
ison of biometric templates in the transformed domain. In
accordance with the ISO/IEC IS 24745 [2] on biometric in-
formation protection, technologies of cancelable biometrics
meet the two major requirements of irreversibility, i.e. the pro-
tected template can not be used to determine any information
about the original biometric sample, while it should be easy
to generate the protected template, and unlinkability.
Ratha et al. [3] were the first to introduce the concept of
cancelable biometrics applying non-invertible transforms to
biometric data at enrolment, using application-dependent pa-
rameters. During authentication, biometric inputs are trans-
formed and compared to the enrolled protected templates. In
past years several concepts implementing cancelable biomet-
rics based on face or iris have been proposed. For a detailed
survey on cancelable biometrics, the reader is referred to [1].
Most existing approaches to cancelable biometrics report
a significant decrease in biometric performance [1]. This
restriction can be overcome by introducing multi-biometric
template protection schemes [4], since a combination of
different biometric characteristics generally leads to higher
accuracy [5]. Within a conventional biometric system, a
fusion of different biometric information can be performed
at feature, score and decision level [6], as defined in the
ISO/IEC TR 24722 on multimodal and other multi-biometric
fusion [7]. Since both score and decision levels require a
separate storage of (protected) templates, with respect to
template protection, feature level has been identified as the
preferable approach [8]. Performing such a fusion represents
a great challenge: it requires a generic framework in order
to establish a common representation of biometric features
[4]. In addition, feature alignment turns out to be a critical
issue since protected templates comprising information of
more than one biometric instance are expected to require a
complex alignment process.
In [9] face and ear features are fused using random pro-
jections and transformation-based feature extraction, reduc-
ing dimensionality with PCA and clustering the features. The
final protected templates improve the performance of both
unimodal traits. The spiral and the continuous components
belonging to two different fingerprints from the same subject
are mixed in one cancelable template in [10]. In [11], voice
and iris data are fused applying different cancelable transfor-
mations for each modality.
In 2013, Rathgeb et al. [12] introduced cancelable bio-
metrics based on Bloom filters, which has been applied to
different biometric characteristics, e.g. iris [12] or face [13].
It has been shown that the concept can be used to generate
irreversible protected templates which are capable of main-
taining biometric performance, e.g. EERs of approximately
1% and 5% for iris and face, respectively [12, 13]. Further-
more, it has been shown that the concept can be employed
in a multi-biometric scenario, in particular a multi-instance
single-algorithm scenario protecting iris-codes at feature level
[14]. Recently, Hermans et al. [15] provided a security anal-
ysis of this scheme, in particular of the original proposal [12].
While the authors confirm the irreversibility property of the
system, it is shown that the scheme is vulnerable to cross-
matching attacks. In particular, they prove that, given two
cancelable templates generated from a single biometric sam-
ple, it is possible to cross-match the templates.
In this work, we (1) propose a generic feature level fu-
sion of Bloom filter-based templates based on face and iris,
(2) restricting our aim to the irreversibility of the stored ref-
erence. On the one hand, compared to [14], we adress a
multi-instance multi-algorithm scenario, which represents a
more challenging issue w.r.t. multi-biometric fusion at fea-
ture level. On the other hand, the design of transforms based
on secret tokens in order to achieve unlinkability is subject of
future work. Unlinkability can be achieved by transforming
the feature vector prior to the Bloom filter-based transform or
by extending the transform to a non-linear function, as sug-
gested in [15]. In addition, in [16] it is shown that Bloom
filter-based representations of biometric templates can be di-
rectly mapped to a set of unique features suitable as input for
cross-matching resistant cryptographic primitives.
We have selected these characteristics as they can be cap-
tured with a single device that may have a sensor for 2D-
face image acquisition and an NIR-sensor for iris acquisi-
tion. Such a single device has clear advantages regarding
the transaction time, besides being more user-friendly than
using multiple sensors for a single recognition system. It is
shown that the proposed technique significantly improves the
privacy protection and maintains the performance, i.e.∼0.4%
EER),of a conventional score level fusion on the BioSecure
face corpus and the IITD iris database.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2 the pro-
posed feature level fusion based on Bloom filters is described
in detail. Experimental evaluations are presented in Sect. 3
and conclusions are drawn in Sect. 4.
2. PROTECTED FEATURE LEVEL FUSION
In this section, the Bloom filter-based feature level fusion, the
comparison of protected templates, and the resulting privacy
protection in terms of irreversibility are described.
2.1. Bloom Filter-based Transform and Fusion
In the proposed multi-biometric system depicted in Fig. 1,
Bloom filters, i.e. bit arrays of length 2w where initially
all bits are set to 0, are utilized in order to obtain an irre-
versible representation of binary face and iris features. For
both characteristics, binary feature vectors are arranged in a
two-dimensional matrix of width WF (WI ) and height HF
(HI ). Each two-dimensional binary code is then divided into
blocks of equal size where each column consists of wF (wI )
bits, respectively. The irreversible transform h maps each
binary column to its equivalent decimal value, setting to 1 the
bit indexed by this value in the corresponding Bloom filter,
as shown for two different codewords (i.e. columns stem-
ming from face and iris) as part of Fig. 1. For each column
x ∈ {0, 1}w, the mapping is defined as,
b[h(x)] = 1, with h(x) =
w−1∑
p=0
xp · 2p, (1)
The entire sequence of columns of each block is succes-
sively transformed to corresponding locations within Bloom
filters; that is, protected templates are defined as sets of
Bloom filters, TF = {bF1,bF2, . . . ,bFKF } and TI =
{bI1,bI2, . . . ,bIKI}, where KF and KI define the num-
ber of blocks, and according Bloom filters are of size 2wF
and 2wI . Within the original concept of Bloom filters [17]
multiple hash functions are applied to large chunks of bytes.
Since the size of codewords is small, |x| ≤ 10, the proposed
mapping is already collision-free and hash function would not
add additional security. Focusing on the privacy protection
of multiple biometrics, i.e. face and iris, the two protected
templates denoted by TF and TI are required to have the
same length: ||TF = TI ||. With respect to iris biomet-
ric features, this transform generates, to a certain extent, an
alignment-free representation [12]. For face the alignment
is done in the pre-processing step exploiting the horizontal
baseline between the center of the eyes.
As the final step, both protected templates are fused
by bit-wise ORing them, i.e. the final protected template
T is estimated as T = TF ∨ TI . The fusion process
conceals the origin of bits with respect to biometric char-
acteristics. It will be shown that this simple fusion pro-
cess highly improves the privacy protection provided by
the Bloom filter-based transform. Since optimal choices of
wF (wI ) depend on biometric characteristics and feature
extraction algorithms (see [12, 13]), |bF | = |bI | may not
hold. However, in case |bF | 6= |bI |, n × 2min{wF ,wI} =
2max{wF ,wI} with n ∈ N, holds. Note that according
Bloom filters consist of 2w bits, where w = max{wF , wI}.
The fused templateT, which potentially results from a fusion
of many small Bloom filters with a few large Bloom filters,
is represented as, T = {b1,b2, . . . ,bmin{KF ,KI}}, where
min{KF ,KI} Bloom filters consist of a total number of 2w
bits w = max{wF , wI} bits.
2.2. Comparison of Protected Templates
The sum of all detected disagreements between any corre-
sponding pairs of bits divided by the amount of compared
bits yields the fractional Hamming distance (HD) as a mea-
sure of dissimilarity between pairs of binary biometric fea-
ture vectors [18]. Let |b| denote the amount of bits within a
Bloom filter b set to 1. Then, the dissimilarity DS between
two Bloom filters bi and bj of same size is defined as [12],
DS (bi,bj) =
HD(bi,bj)
|bi|+ |bj | |bi|, |bj | 6= 0. (2)
The final comparison score S between two fused tem-
platesTi andTj is then defined as the average of all pair-wise
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the proposed Bloom filter-based feature level fusion approach based on face and iris.
Bloom filter dissimilarity scores,
S(Ti,Tj) =
1
min{KF ,KI}
min{KF ,KI}∑
p=1
DS(bip,bjp).
(3)
2.3. Irreversibility Analysis
Focusing on the mono-modal protected templates, TF ,TI ,
original positions of bit columns within according blocks are
concealed, i.e. given a Bloom filter b of the final protected
template T it is not clear from which column a distinct 1-bit
in the protected template originates. In addition, high corre-
lation between columns, especially neighboring ones, is ex-
pected. Consequently, a significant amount of columns are
mapped to identical positions in Bloom filters even for small
values of l (i.e. number of columns per block). We assume
that after inserting l columns from a block there are |b| bits
set to 1 within a Bloom filter. Hence, the probability of re-
mapping a bit to a certain position is 1−|b|/l. For a potential
attacker the reconstruction of the original binary code part in-
volves arranging |b| codewords to l positions. For |b| ≤ l
the theoretical amount of possible sequences is recursively
defined as f(|b|, l), where each of the |b| codewords have to
appear at least once within l columns [12],
f(|b|, l) =

1, if |b| = 1,
|b|l −
|b|−1∑
i=1
(|b|
i
)
× f(i, l) otherwise. (4)
In other words, all sequences where less than |b| codewords
appear are subtracted from the number of all possible se-
quences, |b|l, yielding a rapid increase of possible sequences
even for small values of |b|.
If we assume that a potential attacker knows the em-
ployed feature extraction algorithms and the amount of dif-
ferent columns within corresponding blocks contributing to
the |b| bits set in a single Bloom filter b (in reality an attacker
may only exploit certain statistics) the amount of possible
sequences resulting in this fused Bloom filter can be theoreti-
cally estimated as,( |b|
|bF |
)
×f(|bF |, lF )×
( |bF |
|bI | − (|b| − |bF |)
)
×f(|bI |, lI).
(5)
In order to reconstruct both original binary templates, first
the |bF | bits originating from face biometric features have to
be chosen from the total amount of bits set to 1, |b|. Sub-
sequently, the remaining |bI | − (|b| − |bF |) bits have to be
chosen out of |bF | (note that |b| − |bF | bits must be selected
in the second step, and are out of the possible combinations
count). Finally, all sequences generating both bit sets have
to be tested. The proposed fusion technique significantly in-
creases the number of possible combinations which result in
a single Bloom filter and, thus, improves the privacy protec-
tion provided by the fused template. In Sect. 3.3 we present
a practical irreversibility estimation for the specific face and
iris template sizes used in the experimental analysis.
3. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Biometric performance is estimated in terms of False Non-
Match Rate (FNMR) at a targeted False Match Rate (FMR)
and Equal Error Rate (EER) in accordance to the ISO/IEC IS
19795-1 [19]. The security of the protected system is config-
ured by the targeted FMR and estimated as FMR−1, i.e. the
required number of protected templates need to obtain a false
acceptance [1] and privacy protection is defined as the number
of different bit sequences yielding a distinct representation.
3.1. Experimental Setup
Experiments are carried out on a fused dataset using the face
subcorpus included in the Desktop Dataset of the Multimodal
Table 1. Parameter choice for both feature extraction algo-
rithms for both biometric characteristics.
System W ×H l w K ||T||
Face 32∗·(40 ×60) 15 5 32∗·32 215
Iris 512×20 32 10 32 215
∗for 32 (out of the original 80) sub-regions in the face image.
Table 2. Performance rates of original and protected systems
(FNMRs are obtained at FMR=0.01%).
System
Original Unprotected Protected
1-FNMR EER 1-FNMR EER
Face 70.079 6.536 72.857 5.919
Iris 96.587 0.929 97.339 0.784
Fusion 97.301 0.489 98.063 0.411
BioSecure Database1 [20], which comprises four frontal face
images of 210 subjects, captured in two time-spaced ac-
quisition sessions, and the IITD Iris Database version 1.02
which comprises 1120 NIR images from 224 different sub-
jects, where only the first four left eye images of the first
210 subjects are considered. For each subject, four pairs
of face and eye images are formed for conducting genuine
comparisons, and a single pair of face and eye images is
applied for imposter comparisons, leading to a total num-
ber of 4 · 3 · 210/2 = 1, 260 genuine comparisons and
210 · 210/2 = 22, 050 imposter comparisons.
For feature extraction as well as parameter selection, we
refer to the configurations identified as most adequate in [12,
13], where ||TF = TI || holds (see last column in Table 1).
In facial images eyes were automatically annotated using Ver-
iLook SDK 4.0, developed by Neurotechnology3. The Fac-
eRecLib of the free signal and image processing toolbox Bob4
[21] is utilized in order to extract facial features based on lo-
cal Gabor pattern histogram sequences [22]. In this particular
implementation, each image is divided into 8×10 sub-regions
where only the central 4 × 8 sub-regions are used. The fea-
ture extraction generates and concatenates 32 × 40 = 1, 280
59-bit histograms, which are padded with a 0 prior to the bi-
narization step, in order to obtain 60 bins per histograms, a
non-prime number that allows a further division of each sub-
region into 40/wF × 60/lF sub-blocks for each of the 32
sub-regions. Histograms are simply binarized by setting bins
greater than zero to one.
Focusing on eye images, at pre-processing the iris of
a given sample image is detected, un-wrapped to an en-
1Biosecure Multimodal Database,
http://biosecure.it-sudparis.eu/AB
2IITD Iris Database version 1.0,
http://www4.comp.polyu.edu.hk/˜csajaykr/IITD/
Database_Iris.htm
3VeriLook SDK 4.0,
http://www.neurotechnology.com/verilook.html
4Bob Toolbox, http://idiap.github.io/bob/
Table 3. Number of average bits set to one (|b|) and number
of possible sequences an attacker would have to try in order
to recover the face, the iris or both unprotected templates.
System
Mono-modal BF Multi-modal BF
|b| Sequences |b| Sequences
Face 6.33 239+10 202.56 2111+5
Iris 16.73 2126+5 16.73 2208+5
Fusion - - 215.24 2263+5
hanced rectangular texture of 512 × 64 pixels applying the
weighted adaptive Hough algorithm proposed in [23]. In the
feature extraction stage, iris-codes are extracted based on a
dyadic wavelet transform provided in a custom implemen-
tation within the University of Salzburg Iris Toolkit v1.05.
This feature extraction algorithm, which was proposed by Ma
et al. [24], a dyadic wavelet transform is performed on 10
signals obtained from the according texture stripes. The final
code is 512 × 20 = 10, 240 bits. For both characteristics,
template comparisons are performed by calculating the frac-
tional Hamming distance (±8 circular bit-shifts are applied
in each direction in order to compensate for rotations in the
unprotected system). In the unprotected system the fusion is
performed at score level (without normalisation) employing
the sum-rule with equal weights of scores.
The parameter configurations are summarized in Table 1,
where it can be observed that both protected templates are
formed ofKF×2wF = KI×2wI = 215 bits. For face and iris,
a number of 15 5-bit and 32 10-bit columns are transformed
to Bloom filters of size 25 bit and 210 bits, respectively. It
is important to note that a total number of 15 × 1, 024/32 =
480 columns of the binary face template and 32 columns of
the iris-code are transformed to a single Bloom filter. It is
important to note that the distribution of bits originating from
face and iris, which contribute to the final protected template,
is rather unbalanced.
3.2. Performance and Security Evaluation
The performance rates of original (unprotected) and protected
systems are summarized in Table 2. As expected, the score
level fusion of face and iris significantly improves the bio-
metric performance in the original system yielding a decrease
of the EER by 47% compared to the iris biometric system.
Furthermore, we observe that the Bloom filter protection
scheme maintains (and even slightly improves) biometric
performance for face and iris as reported in [12, 13], how-
ever, we do not consider this performance gain as significant.
More importantly, biometric performance is maintained in
the fusion scenario, i.e. the proposed feature level fusion ob-
tains comparable performance with respect to the score level
fusion based on the sum-rule.
5USIT – University of Salzburg Iris Toolkit v1.0,
http://www.wavelab.at/sources/
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Fig. 2. Possible sequences (per block) for chosen block sizes
and proportion of re-mapped columns per 1024-bit chunks.
Moreover, we evaluated the performance of the fused pro-
tected system for authentication attempts with a single bio-
metric characteristic. Presenting only the face, the biomet-
ric performance is similar to the protected system based on
face only, resulting in an EER of 5.21%. If only an image
of the eye is captured, performance decreases to an EER of
1.96% compared to the protected system based only on iris.
This means, that by parametrizing the authentication method
according to the available biometric characteristics, i.e. the
decision threshold is set based on the which features are pre-
sented, the system can be configured for various security lev-
els. As previously mentioned for a targeted FNMR, security
is estimated as FMR−1, i.e. for low, medium, and high secu-
rity applications face, iris, or a combination of both can be set
as mandatory biometric inputs.
In order to quantify the irreversibility level provided by
the fused protected template, we estimate the average number
of columns within processed blocks which are transformed to
identical indexes of according Bloom filters. Fig. 2 (top) illus-
trates the number of column sequences for a given number of
ones in a Bloom filter, with respect to the selected parameters
for protecting facial and iris biometric templates. Note that
the number of sequences increases rapidly (log scale on y-
axis). Fig. 2 (bottom) depicts the amount of re-mapped code-
words, where for face we consider sets of 32 Bloom filters
yielding a total amount of 32 × 25 = 210 bits. The average
number of bits per Bloom filter and the amount of possible
sequences originating a given template are shown in Table 3.
As can be seen in Fig. 2 (bottom) for the protected mono-
modal face and iris systems, an average of approximately
57.82% and 47.73% of the columns occur more than once,
leading to 15 · (1 − 0.5782) = 6.33 bits set to one for face
(|bF | = 32 · 6.33 = 202.56) and |bI | = 32 · (1− 0.4773) =
16.73 for iris. Therefore, according to Fig. 2 (top), there are
239 and 2126 sequences that can generate each of the 210 and
25 Bloom filters, respectively.
3.3. Irreversibility Analysis
The average number of words mapped into one fused Bloom
filter is 15 · 32 + 32 = 512. Therefore, the number of bits
set to one is |b| = 512 · (1 − 0.5796) = 215.24. According
to Eq. 5 and the values described above, the total of possible
face and iris sequences is estimated as,(
215
202
)
× 244 ×
(
202
17− (215− 202)
)
× 2126 ∼ 2263
On the other hand, an eventual attacker who wants to recover
only the face or the iris would have to try the following num-
ber of sequences,(
215
202
)
× 244 ∼ 2111 for face,
(
215
17
)
× 2126 ∼ 2208 for iris.
Those numbers must be multiplied by K Bloom filters of the
according protected template in order to recover the whole
unprotected template.
As may be observed, the number of possible sequences,
and therefore the privacy, of the single traits considerably
increases (from 249 to 2116 for face, and from 2108 to 2213
for iris) between the mono-modal and multi-modal protected
templates. Furthermore, the total amount of sequences an
eventual attacker would have to try in order to recover both
traits raises to ∼ 2268 (!). It should be noted that, follow-
ing this procedure, the original binary unprotected templates
would be recovered, but not the original image. An inverse
engineering process would have to be applied to those tem-
plates in order to obtain the images [25].
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we proposed a generic feature level fusion of
protected templates, obtained from irreversible Bloom filter-
based transforms, and applied it to face and iris samples. A
detailed privacy analysis of the presented approach is given
and the experimental evaluation shows that the protected
multi-biometric system maintains the biometric performance
(EER ∼ 0.4%) compared to the score level fusion of the
original unprotected systems. The privacy of the user is
also increased: an eventual attacker would have to try up to
∼ 2268 sequences in order to recover the unprotected binary
templates. Furthermore, the presented fusion highly reduced
the amount of required storage. For the used parameter con-
figuration, original facial templates of 76,800 bits and original
iris-codes of 10,240 bits are compressed to a single protected
template of size 32,768 bits, i.e. a compression of 63% with
respect to the original size is obtained.
To achieve full multi-biometric template protection,
which is out of scope in this paper, some ideas have been
proposed, e.g. in [15, 16]. Future work will be focused on
incorporating application-specific non-linear transforms to
columns of binary templates prior to the Bloom filter-based
transform to provide unlinkability.
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